On September 27, 1941, the SS Partick Henry, the first Liberty-class ship, was launched in Baltimore, USA. More than 2,700 similar ships would be built in the following years to support the war effort by transporting supplies, weapons, and soldiers.
For many, these ships contributed decisively to the Allied victory in the “Battle of the Atlantic,” as by mid-1943, American shipyards were launching a ship every 3 to 4 days, a feat that German submarines simply could not match. This fact, combined with several other – humble – examples, such as standardized food rations, tank carriers, or battlefield healthcare, were the real “force multipliers” that allowed the Allies to prevail in World War II.
For – almost – three years now, a state of war has been maintained between Ukraine and Russia. These operations are the first on the European continent, after decades of peace, and they are also the first in decades where the two belligerents can be characterized as near peers. This is of great importance for the observations and lessons that can be drawn from the analysis of the operations. At this point, two important points should be made:
1. The first concerns the near peer designation. Typically, Ukraine cannot be compared in any field, demographic, economic or military, with Russia. However, the continuous aid or “help” (it is recalled that Great Britain repaid the last installment of the Lend-Lease program, that is, American aid during World War II, on December 29, 2006) both economically and militarily from almost all the countries of the “Western bloc” allows Ukraine to stand “on equal terms” (at least so far).
2. Although many countries have provided aid to Ukraine, none of them is in a state of war. Also, and despite the relevant announcements, even this increase in the ability to manufacture ammunition by European defense industries does not seem to be at “war levels” (if we can use this term).
It is also generally accepted that military operations at this level are usually judged by their industrial extension, that is, the ability of the respective industry to cope with and satisfy the relevant requirements. Modern operations of this type have shown that “humble” systems, such as guns and multiple launchers, continue to be critical success factors.
After three years of operations, neither of the two warring sides has managed to achieve a decisive blow to the opponent, a blow that would allow the operations to be terminated. Let us note here that without this “decisive blow” neither side seems to have the opening of negotiations as a first priority, as both estimate that they can “win” even more (or at least lose less).
Also, at first glance it seems that Ukrainians (out of desperation perhaps?) show an ease in adaptability and in the development of new and disruptive technologies and methods of operations. But is this so, or is the reality different?
The first area that should be further evaluated is the ability of the Ukrainian state apparatus to continue, even after three years of bombing. Let us recall that – especially in the first months – the Russian air bombings showed high success rates, as the Ukrainian air defense was largely based on old Soviet-era systems.
A large number of these bombings (mainly with cruise missiles) targeted data centers and other corresponding infrastructures of the Ukrainian state apparatus. These attacks were accompanied by extremely successful cyberattacks.
But it seems that not only does the Ukrainian state entity remain intact but it is constantly developing, as it would be extremely difficult to sustain military operations lasting three years. Behind this success lies a software company, Microsoft, which in no way can be considered a “defense industry”.
However, Microsoft’s involvement – literally up to the last minute – both in the digitalization of the state apparatus and in achieving the required resilience for the duration of the operations allowed the Ukrainian state apparatus to remain intact and functional. The details and “dark spots” of this involvement are not here, but they can be used to draw important observations (for those wondering, we will refer to the Tallinn Manual 2.0 – Rule 1 and not only…).
The second company that concerns us is Starlink and the provision of broadband internet connections to the Ukrainian armed forces. Also, Starlink is not a company that produces military equipment, although up to a point it had taken a clear position in favor of Ukraine, by sending thousands of satellite dishes. Even today, the Ukrainian forces rely, almost exclusively, on Starlink to provide internet and access to a multitude of computer systems. This access is what allows the Ukrainian forces to have a clear picture of the field of operations, but also to develop other solutions, such as unmanned vehicles of all types.
Relevant reports, already from the beginning of the war, reveal that the Russians have implemented a dual tactic, on the one hand, destroying the infrastructure (power, internet, etc.) that are critical for maintaining control of operations (battle management) and on the other, implementing electronic warfare operations on a scale that has not been observed in operations so far.
It is no exaggeration to say that Ukrainian forces rely almost exclusively on access to Starlink, and removing this capability would literally vaporize everything they have achieved in the field, whether it is tactical situational awareness, UxVs (e.g. Magura VS, Mykola, etc.), or FPV (first person view) drones, as each respective system relies on satellite internet (which is provided by a company on a large scale and at a competitive price on the planet) to successfully complete its mission.
