All wars at some point end in one of three ways: absolute victory on the battlefield, political negotiations, armistice. How could the war in Ukraine be ended? Rarely does one side succeed in fully imposing its will on the other (see Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II). Absolute victory is impossible to achieve in the Ukraine war, because neither the conquest of the whole of Ukraine is possible by Russia nor the total expulsion of Russia from the territories it has already annexed. A more common practice is to end the war through negotiations. But this is not so simple. The inability to negotiate a favorable end to a war is a frequent strategic flaw. Ukraine seems to have missed two such opportunities.
The first opportunity presented itself in the negotiations that took place a few weeks after the start of the Russian invasion, at a time when Moscow had failed in its strategic goal of capturing Kiev. Then, while one initial agreement had been reached, Ukraine’s leadership backed down, figuring time was on its side. The second chance was missed in the fall of 2022 after the successful Ukrainian counterattack. Then the head of the US Armed Forces, General Mark Milley, urged the Ukrainians to translate their military success into political gains at the negotiating table. The Ukrainians again estimated that time works in their favor, but the developments denied them.
Who does time work for today? Both sides are hoping that time will work in their favor. Ukraine hopes that with the help of the USA it will be able to reverse the unfavorable situation on the war front, while Russia sees that the balance of power is gradually changing in its favor and thus in the future it will be able to negotiate from a better position. As long as both combatants hope to improve their relative bargaining position, the war will continue. This does not mean that the war will last indefinitely. If foreign aid is reduced, as is likely, Ukraine will be forced to seek political negotiation. The possibility of a sudden collapse of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – due to fatigue or lack of weapons and ammunition – or an end to the war under the pressure of Ukrainian public opinion cannot be ruled out either.
Leadership is also a volatile factor. History offers plenty of examples of leaders who persisted in continuing wars that could have been ended profitably (Bosnian Serbs) or even worse continued wars that were long lost (Hitler). Accordingly, a change of leadership during a war has often led to its termination (De Gaulle in the Algerian War).
A change in political leadership in the US or Ukraine could hasten the end of the war. The US is facing a presidential election this year that could bring to power former President Donald Trump, who claims that, if elected, he will end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. He doesn’t specify how he will do this, but we can assume: direct negotiation with Putin. It is not uncommon for the powerful to make summit agreements and then impose them on the weak (Yalta). In Ukraine, if the failures on the war front continue, there will be a question of a change of leadership. This – combined with the creeping weariness of Ukrainian society – could lead to political negotiations.
This brings us to the heart of the negotiations. Based on the positions that each side has formulated, a successful conclusion to negotiations is impossible. But if each of the three sides focuses on their core interests, an agreement could be reached. Such interests, in addition to avoiding nuclear escalation, are: For Russia, the neutrality of Ukraine and control over the Russian-dominated eastern provinces. For Ukraine, the provision of credible international guarantees – which would secure it in the event of a new Russian invasion – combined with a prospect of reconstruction (e.g. entry into the EU). For the US, ensuring that Russia does not attack third countries (either NATO or other neighbors) and maintaining the existing security architecture in Europe.
However, there are a number of “sensitive issues” that will have to be resolved or circumvented in order to reach an agreement.
- Borders. The new border line will be different from the border of Ukraine in 1991. But neither Ukraine nor the West will recognize this. So there will be de facto territorial control, as in Korea and Cyprus.
- Demilitarization of Ukraine. Russia will seek a low military ceiling on the Ukrainian Armed Forces so that Ukraine does not have the ability to claim lost territory or threaten Russia itself. Ukraine will hardly agree.
- Penalties. Russia will seek the lifting of all sanctions against it. The West cannot accept it. A possible compromise in this regard is the gradual lifting of sanctions that would be linked to the achievement of targets. This model was adopted in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.
- Who will bear the burden of reconstruction and what reparations will Russia have to pay? The World Bank estimates that $486 billion is needed to rebuild Ukraine. This is how the issue of Russian assets that have been pledged to Western banks will be brought to the table. Western countries will seek the pledged 300 billion dollars to be used for reconstruction. Russia will hardly agree.
- Trial of war crimes.
Because the resolution of the above issues will have enormous political costs, it is logical for the leaders of the warring parties to prefer ending the war by the armistice method combined with informal agreements. A classic example is the armistice agreement that ended hostilities in Korea in 1953. A ceasefire agreement that merely “freezes” the conflict in Ukraine will be fragile.
As Clausewitz aptly points out, “even total victory in war cannot be regarded as final. Defeated states often regard the outcome of war as a temporary misfortune, which can be rectified when political conditions change at some point in the future.’ By this logic, any truce reached would be temporary until the balance of power changed. The Ukrainian issue will continue to be a serious source of instability in the international system in the coming decades.
