If one takes a look at the statements of the officials of the Western countries on the occasion of the completion of one year since the start of the war in Ukraine, one will find two facts.
The first is the tone that the priority is the escalation of the effort to defeat the Ukrainian side and defeat the Russian side. A tone that translates into a position in favor of continuing the war until Ukraine is defeated and the Russian armed forces are pushed back. Continuation without a clear time horizon: “We are with you, for as long as it takes,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote on Twitter. In a similar tone, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, wrote that “the EU stood by the people of Ukraine. We will continue to do so and Ukraine will shine again.” “Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia. Never” President Biden wrote for his part. “We will continue to provide the vital resources Ukraine needs, for as long as it takes.”
What does “defeat of Russia” really mean for West?
All of this has to do with the way the war in Ukraine is currently viewed by Western powers primarily as a way to “defeat Russia.” That is, all the issues that have arisen, the post-war settlement, the reconstruction, the reparation of the injustice suffered by Ukraine, are considered to be possible only through a clear defeat of Russia in military operations.
Although the concept of defeat is not clearly defined, as Western countries largely avoid adopting the Ukrainian definition of Russia’s defeat, which is the withdrawal of Russian forces from all territories they hold, including Crimea, it is nevertheless clear that they talk about defeat.
The problem is that this defeat is not only sought as a means of correcting injustice, but is also related to a more comprehensive stance towards Russia as a threatening, destabilizing force that undermines stability in Europe. This dimension also explains why there is an emphasis on the “defeat of Russia”.
This, obviously, has nothing to do with what Moscow’s rhetoric reproduces, namely some kind of hostility of the West towards Russian culture. Much more to do with, especially as a starting point, the fact that the US was not comfortable anyway with having a country, with characteristics in terms of superpower defense systems, claiming to have a distinct foreign policy and of course.
It is no coincidence that Russia is now also seen as a threat at the level of the US National Security Strategy or NATO strategy, or the fact that statements are being made about how Russia threatens European security as a whole. In the same spirit and the opinions that what is needed is a strategy of “retention” (containment) of Russia in the way that after a famous telegram of George Kennan, then the US ambassador in Moscow, in February 1946, the American foreign policy and defense policy set the containment of the USSR as a key priority.
But, as it is easily understood, such an approach necessarily charges the way the West perceives the war in Ukraine and explains this much support and essentially involvement, even if it avoids “direct involvement”.
What does “as long as necessary” mean?
Of course, the question is what does as long as necessary mean. And this is because it is clear that even with even greater armaments, the possibility that Russia will be forced into a major retreat does not appear to be so easy and, above all, quick. Instead, everything points to an ongoing war of attrition, with both sides insisting on mutual bombing, attempting to hit infrastructure with missile attacks, and bloody battles for small-scale strategic points, such as those for the capture of urban centers, and where Ukraine hopes to begin to phase in the new tanks it is receiving and Russia to fully integrate the potential of part-time conscription.
All this does not point to an easy ending of the war, without some political decision or initiative in this direction. Rather they refer to a conflict that will continue, at first with escalating tension and which at best will simply “freeze” with constant flare-ups.
At the same time, a prolongation of the war not only increases the cost in lives – given that in practice both sides rely on the perception of mobilizing large numbers with the acceptance of possible casualties – but also the risk of an even greater flare-up. And of course the pressure to further upgrade the weapons systems of the Ukrainian forces, from one point on makes the distinction between direct Western involvement and simple support indistinct, which brings closer the possibility of a “direct” confrontation between Russian and Western forces, which would mean a completely different development, as here the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons also begins to appear on the horizon.
The difficulty of the “peace process”
The above explains why it seems difficult to have a Western-initiated peace process today. And this in such cases the peace process also means some kind of compromise, it requires some type of mutual concessions. That is, now in Ukraine it seems difficult to be able to return to the treaty before the war or even more the treaty before 2014.
But at the same time almost no side is looking for a compromise that can ensure a medium-term peace. The very fact that some type of “defeat of Russia” is an element of Western planning more generally and not narrowly in relation to war makes matters worse, as, among other things, it increases the pressure for even more armaments and prolongation of the war, even though already there are voices pointing out the multiple problems from a prolongation of the war.
And the problem is precisely that within this emerging “post-Cold War world”, with the new dividing lines and contrasts, not only strategies are formed but also ways of thinking and perceiving reality that do not so easily allow such conflicts to be dealt with in terms of compromises. At best we are talking a way of thinking that can go as far as a “frozen” conflict (with active sanctions, etc.) pending rekindling.
