“Inside Deutsche Bank”: Trump’s Companies engaged in transactions with Azerbaijan’s money-laundering network

On November 9, 2016, the world woke up in shock at the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. Donald Trump’s unexpected victory placed Deutsche Bank in a difficult position.

The president-elect had outstanding debts to the bank exceeding $300 million (approximately €270 million). What would happen if he decided not to repay them? And how should the bank respond to any future requests for loans from him?

Approving such requests could expose the bank to accusations of preferential treatment, while refusing them could damage its relationship with the incoming U.S. administration.

Faced with this unprecedented conflict of interest, the bank established—as early as December 2016—a special framework for Trump and his associates, designated as a “covered client” status. A special committee and strict procedures were established: encrypted communications, files accessible only to a very small number of employees, the concealment of the beneficiaries’ names, and the use of a safe to store hard-copy documents.

The “Inside Deutsche Bank” data leak, accessed by the newspaper Le Monde, reveals behind-the-scenes details regarding how the bank managed this problematic client, as well as how highly sensitive financial flows involving the U.S. President long managed to bypass the bank’s compliance and oversight mechanisms.

These files, combined with court documents, provide—for the first time—direct evidence of suspicious transactions linking companies owned by Trump to the “Azerbaijani Laundromat.” Azerbaijan’s money-laundering operation—a secret fund amounting to nearly $3 billion, uncovered in 2017 by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), an international investigative journalism consortium, and Le Monde—was used throughout the 2010s to purchase political influence and misappropriate public funds for the benefit of the Azerbaijani elite in Baku.

Money Laundering Operations

In the spring of 2015, just weeks before announcing his candidacy for the Republican nomination, Trump was involved in a project to build a luxury hotel in the capital of Azerbaijan: the Trump International Hotel & Tower Baku.

On April 16, a Delaware-based company owned by Trump—DT Marks Baku LLC, which was responsible for collecting licensing fees for the use of the “Trump” brand in connection with this real estate project—received a bank transfer of $141,261.82, with the sole payment reference: “payment for invoice no. 568.”

The funds originated from Faberlex LP, a Scottish-based shell company with no offices or employees. Faberlex was funded by the Azerbaijani state-owned telecommunications company, Baktelecom, via an account held at the Estonian branch of Danske Bank—one of Denmark’s largest banks and a key player in this money-laundering network.

The transaction failed due to an error in entering the beneficiary’s account number, and the funds were returned to Faberlex. The very next day, the exact same amount—down to the last cent—was sent to the bank account of an offshore shell company, Datemile Alliance, under the stated purpose: “payment pursuant to contract no. 9.”

This transfer likely served as an intermediary step, intended to obscure the path of the funds. Twelve days later, the second attempt was successfully completed.

Faberlex transferred the $141,261.82 to THC Baku Services—another company owned by Trump—this time citing “payment for invoice no. 2” as the reason.

The same sum moving between four different bank accounts in just two weeks, with three different stated purposes?

This pattern is characteristic of how money-laundering operations function. By multiplying the number of transfers and altering the payment descriptions, those behind the transactions conceal the financial trail, making it nearly impossible to trace the origin of the funds.

This complexity obscures the link between the—often illicit—source of the money and its ultimate recipient. And this is no coincidence: Datemile and Faberlex were at the heart of the “Azerbaijani Laundromat” network. A document from the Deutsche Bank archives, which describes this massive money-laundering operation, states that Faberlex played a “central role.”

Confidentiality Level = 99

Deutsche Bank should have monitored these suspicious financial flows. Acting as a correspondent bank, its New York branch served as an intermediary between Danske Bank Estonia and Capital One—the bank used by the Trump companies—facilitating these international dollar-denominated transactions.

However, lost among the millions of daily transactions processed on behalf of reputable European banks, these specific transfers went unnoticed.

Trump’s election did nothing to heighten the bank’s vigilance. On the contrary, the compartmentalization of information—enforced through a “covered client” status—erected a financial wall around the President’s business activities.

Alerts concerning these politically sensitive accounts, which bore the designation “Confidentiality Level = 99,” were visible only to a small group of analysts at the bank. The system was so opaque that the closest associate of Deutsche Bank’s CEO admitted, in an email to the “risk management” team, that cross-referencing data across the various companies within Trump’s business empire was a real headache; anti-money laundering data were scattered and, at best, “fragmentary.”

When journalists contacted Deutsche Bank regarding its relationship with Trump, the bank stated: “We do not comment on existing or potential client relationships.”

In the spring of 2019, the new Democratic majority in the House of Representatives ordered the bank to hand over a decade’s worth of financial records. The goal was to clarify suspicions regarding Russian interference in Trump’s 2016 election campaign.

Caught off guard, the bank accelerated “Project Broadway”—an internal review launched in 2017—aimed at conducting an in-depth investigation into these very suspicions. Bank accounts belonging to the US President and his associates were subjected to intense scrutiny, while law firms examined financial records spanning several years.

During this retrospective investigation—conducted more than four years after the events in question—links to Azerbaijan were uncovered, and the relevant information was forwarded to the bank’s internal investigative units.

In May 2020, a confidential memorandum sent to the German financial regulatory authority revealed that the transaction linking the Trump business empire to an Azerbaijani money-laundering network was neither isolated nor coincidental.

The memorandum, drafted by Brian Haggerty—head of financial intelligence for Deutsche Bank in the US—stated that the German bank’s American branch had filed a Suspicious Activity Report on January 16, 2020. This report explicitly named the entities DT Marks Baku and THC Baku, citing their connection to the “Azerbaijani Laundromat” money-laundering network.

Haggerty clarified, however, that “Trump was not identified as a suspect.”

“3 million dollars”

Reconstructing the history of suspicious transactions involving two of Trump’s companies, Haggerty confirmed that “entities allegedly linked to money-laundering operations in Azerbaijan and Russia” had paid at least 3 million dollars to these companies prior to September 2015.

He also noted that another Suspicious Activity Report, filed in June 2017, concerned other companies linked to Trump, involving a total sum of 5.2 million dollars.

In this instance, too, the U.S. President was not identified as a person “with ownership or control over the specific corporate entities.”

Ultimately, the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, served as a jolt. Five days later, Deutsche Bank publicly announced that it was severing ties with the outgoing president.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the process proved to be more time-consuming. Capital One, the American bank where Trump held accounts for many of his companies, closely monitored financial flows linked to his business activities as part of a highly confidential program called “Project Safeguard.”

Nevertheless, it waited until the spring of 2021 to close more than 300 accounts associated with Trump, citing suspicions of money laundering—including instances involving Azerbaijan.

An incensed Trump filed a lawsuit in 2025, claiming he had been subjected to what he termed “de-banking”—that is, being cut off from banking services for reasons he perceived as political. Capital One did not respond to requests for comment.

The Trump Organization has also declined to issue any statement. When asked about the reasons behind these opaque transactions—specifically the collection of royalties from hotel operations via a shell company with no connection to the hospitality sector—Trump’s representatives provided no response.

About the author

The Liberal Globe is an independent online magazine that provides carefully selected varieties of stories. Our authoritative insight opinions, analyses, researches are reflected in the sections which are both thematic and geographical. We do not attach ourselves to any political party. Our political agenda is liberal in the classical sense. We continue to advocate bold policies in favour of individual freedoms, even if that means we must oppose the will and the majority view, even if these positions that we express may be unpleasant and unbearable for the majority.

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