The claim that China cannot become the world’s leading power because it lacks a grand political idea is rooted in an unfounded and peculiar misinterpretation of history. Britain, so the narrative goes, conquered the world through free trade and parliamentary governance. America followed, championing freedom, democracy, and individual rights.
China, we are told, has nothing comparable to offer as a lever for global dominance. Its wealth may be growing, its factories may be dominant, and its technology may be advancing—but without a doctrine that other nations would wish to adopt, it can never exercise global hegemony.
Power Precedes Ideology
The eminent Carl Schmitt would have immediately identified the flaw in this argument, as he clearly understood that political power does not stem from high-minded declarations. Rather, it arises from the capacity to establish rules, draw boundaries, and make decisions regarding what happens when those rules are challenged.
Liberal thought inverts this relationship: it imagines that nations first discover universal principles and subsequently build their power upon them. History, however, typically moves in the opposite direction. A state acquires power, presents its own interests as something “natural,” and ultimately frames them as principles that all of humanity ought to accept. Preaching follows conquest. The moral argument emerges after the economic victory.
The belief that China lacks cultural appeal also reveals how little many Western observers know about the world beyond their own borders. They see Chinese factories, surveillance cameras, and Party officials, yet they remain oblivious to the habits and desires of younger generations across Asia.
Chinese entertainment, digital services, consumer goods, and urban “culture” have acquired an influence that cannot be gauged merely by tallying political speeches.
Carl Schmitt argued that every historical power seeks to shape a political space within which its own principles become the defining ones. Such a space is not created solely through arguments; it develops through trade, institutions, technology, and the gradual adoption of one country’s standards by others.
Consider how Europeans viewed America in the early twentieth century: to many, it was a land of colossal buildings, vulgar wealth, and businessmen who equated money with culture. Oswald Spengler saw in America the final triumph of a civilization that had lost its soul. And yet, within a few decades, Americans transformed everyday consumption into the model of human happiness. The suburban home, the automobile, the refrigerator, and the cinema became symbols of progress. Europe had mocked the American way of life, before learning to imitate it.
The distinction between political power and liberal claims regarding universal truth
Carl Schmitt’s distinction between political power and liberal claims regarding universal truth helps explain this shift. Britain did not become the “workshop of the world” because humanity suddenly discovered the… moral beauty of free trade.
It became powerful because British industry could produce goods more cheaply than its competitors, while British naval power helped secure access to foreign markets. British free trade allowed cheap textiles from Manchester to flood the Indian market, undermining local producers—who had little power to resist the trade policies imposed by their British masters.
As industrial competition from Germany and America intensified, Joseph Chamberlain—an advocate for reforming the Empire’s tariff regime—and other British politicians began to question the very principles their country had long promoted.
American freedom followed a similar path. The freedom to traverse an entire continent depended on road networks financed and organized by the state, on vast reserves of cheap fuel, and on factories capable of producing millions of automobiles.
The British parliamentary system and American constitutional rhetoric gained international prestige because they were hallmarks of successful states. Other nations emulated these institutions, hoping that by doing so, they might also replicate their prosperity.
Carl Schmitt recognized that claims to universal validity often mask the interests of specific powers. What is presented as a principle of civilization is, more often than not, an arrangement that serves those already powerful enough to impose it.
The Rise of China
China is currently developing a way of life that could attain a comparable international reach, though neither its admirers nor its critics have yet settled on what it should be called. Carl Schmitt would likely have focused less on the name and more on the political structure taking shape beneath it.
Chinese cities showcase a form of modernity built around sophisticated infrastructure, high-speed transport, integrated digital services, industrial design, and an unusually close relationship between the state and economic life.
Individual behavior is increasingly mediated by technology, while public authority prioritizes order and collective stability over the liberal conception of individual autonomy.
The appeal of the Chinese system lies in the tangible results attributed to it by its proponents: modern railways, rapid construction, expanding productive capacity, and the image of a government capable of delivering solutions to emerging problems. It offers investments, engineering equipment, trade, and infrastructure, while placing emphasis on sovereign autonomy and non-interference in political affairs.
Schmitt’s conception of a world divided into distinct political spheres provides a way to understand why such an approach challenges the Western assertion that every country must, sooner or later, adopt the same political system.
China’s “International” Language
The language through which China explains its international role is already shifting. Beijing promotes international cooperation rooted in economic development, national sovereignty, and shared prosperity; it presents itself as an ancient civilization that has survived foreign conquests and national humiliations; and it argues that modernization does not necessarily require the abandonment of national traditions.
Carl Schmitt opposed the notion that political life could be reduced to a single, universal system governed by abstract legal principles. His theory of the “Großraum”—or “Greater Space”—concerns the organization of international politics around large regions, each possessing its own dominant powers and political principles.
This theory raises a question that remains highly relevant: must every civilization follow rules established by a single, victorious center, or can multiple centers coexist? China’s official rhetoric is more universal in scope than Schmitt’s regional vision; yet, its emphasis on sovereignty and its opposition to external interference echo some of the same concerns.
Across much of the developing world, Chinese officials can appeal to governments that remember colonialism and remain wary of Western “lessons” regarding “democracy” and “human rights.”
Such approaches do not render China selfless or benevolent. They do, however, demonstrate that a rising power can advance its own interests by presenting its own historical experience as a guide for others.
The economic system takes precedence, and cultural forms spread alongside it
Culture will accomplish the greater part of the remaining work. Carl Schmitt grasped that enduring power cannot be explained solely through formal institutions. Political arrangements also depend on established habits, sentiments of loyalty, and assumptions regarding what constitutes a “normal” life.
The economic system leads the way, and cultural forms spread alongside it. In the past, American corporations brought the American way of life into foreign homes through automobiles, cinema, music, advertising, and consumer goods.
People adopted American habits long before they learned the language of American political philosophy. Something similar may well happen with China.
Its television series, animated works, games, consumer technology, business practices, and modes of urban living are already reaching audiences beyond its borders.
Their future influence will depend on whether these products continue to become increasingly attractive, accessible, and competitive. A generation from now, scholars might give this set of habits an impressive name, describing it as a coherent Chinese philosophy of modern life.
They may discover profound principles within practices that were, initially, devised to solve specific problems. Schmidt would warn against confusing such retrospective interpretations with the actual causes of historical change.
A flourishing civilization acquires interpreters who explain why its success was inevitable. A civilization in decline acquires critics who explain, in detail, why its failure was justified and deserved.
The conclusion is simple: ideas are of decisive importance, yet they do not float—they do not hover—above the material world. They develop within it, draw strength from it, and often vanish when the power that sustained them collapses.
Carl Schmitt rejected the liberal habit of masking political decisions behind appeals to a “neutral” morality and universal law. His critique helps reveal the gap between what great powers proclaim and what they actually do.
Ideology can inspire sacrifices, secure obedience, and persuade people to work or fight in exchange for promises that may never be fulfilled.
In the mass political movements of the twentieth century, governments demonstrated how symbols, slogans, rituals, and promises of a glorious future could mobilize entire populations.
However, ideology alone is not enough to explain the rise and fall of global empires. Britain possessed inexpensive textile products, a merchant fleet, and control over key trade routes.
America possessed oil, immense industrial capacity, a market of continental scale, and the ability to produce highly sought-after goods on a scale that its competitors struggled to match. Alongside these advantages, its political doctrines also spread
China now possesses a highly significant production capacity, extensive transport and energy networks, advanced technology, and an ever-expanding commercial presence.
Whether these foundations can support a new global system remains to be seen.
