On September 2, 2025, the United States carried out a precision strike on a speedboat off the coast of Venezuela, claiming it was carrying drugs destined for a narco-terrorist network, a move made possible by a buildup of U.S. naval units in the southern Caribbean, including warships and a nuclear-powered submarine. This escalation through military intervention raises a crucial question: is this simply about combating drug trafficking, or does it reflect a deeper strategy of prolonged gunboat diplomacy for regime change in Venezuela?
The protracted political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, under both Hugo Chávez and Nicolas Maduro, poses an obvious challenge to the dominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Despite possessing overwhelming conventional military superiority and significant influence over regional politics, the United States has repeatedly avoided full-scale military intervention. Traditional explanations often interpret this restraint as hesitation or waning will. However, in the light of aggressive realism, U.S. inaction can more plausibly be understood as strategic prudence than weakness.
US policy toward Venezuela reflects two basic tenets of great power strategy:
- De-escalation: avoiding the creation of a near battlefield close to the US mainland, and
- Mediation: leveraging local actors and economic tools to impose costs without committing US troops.
While aggressive realism provides the primary analytical framework, we also address unrealistic constraints, such as
- domestic politics,
- regional opposition to intervention, and external support from other major powers (Russia, China) for Maduro.
In doing so, we aim to provide a comprehensive explanation for the US’s non-use of military coercion and its preference for intelligence operations, economic warfare, psychological pressure, and covert operations (CIA).
Alternative Explanations Beyond “Aggressive Realism”
Before advancing the realpolitik argument, it is crucial to recognize complementary factors outside of Aggressive Realism that influence and shape U.S. policy:
- Domestic constraints: American public fatigue and political resistance in Congress, which translates into heavy political costs, make another large-scale military operation extremely unpopular, especially after protracted engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Regional legitimacy costs: Latin American states, including key players such as Colombia and Brazil, along with multilateral bodies such as the Organization of American States, have repeatedly warned that unilateral U.S. intervention would undermine regional sovereignty.
- Legal and Regulatory Obstacles: An invasion without broad international or UN support would raise serious legal concerns and challenge U.S. claims to uphold a rules-based international order.
- Supporters beyond the Western camp: Russia, China, and Cuba have provided military, covert, and financial support to the Maduro regime, increasing the risk of escalation and complicating the calculus for immediate intervention.
These limitations do not contradict the logic of Aggressive Realism. On the contrary, they reinforce it because immediate military intervention carries too many costs to deliver the strategic outcome. Ultimately, Aggressive Realism remains the dominant framework because it explains why restraint, not invasion, has been chosen as the rational hegemonic option.
Is Russian aid a real threat to the US?
Moscow’s ability to effectively support Maduro is very limited. Russia is using Venezuela to tie up very small Russian resources (increasing them for this purpose) in order to force the US to commit multiple resources against Venezuela. In practice, Russia finds it very difficult to defend Venezuela militarily. Because of Ukraine, Russia does not have the real ability or will to engage deeply in a high-stakes military engagement. Maduro, on the other hand, is using the appeal for help to Russia as a “last resort” of desperation.
1. De-escalation: avoiding the creation of a near battlefield close to the US mainland
For a dominant power in the Western Hemisphere like the United States, maintaining stability near its borders is a primary concern. Aggressive realism suggests that great powers prefer to externalize conflict. To fight abroad rather than risk prolonged instability on or near their own territory.
A military invasion of Venezuela, while technically feasible, would likely develop into a long-term occupation. Previous US interventions (e.g., Iraq in 2003, Afghanistan after 2001) have revealed how initial military success can lead to protracted insurgencies, requiring prolonged troop deployments, high reconstruction costs, and political blowback.
Maintaining a large American contingent in Venezuela would risk turning parts of the country into persistent conflict zones—potentially triggering refugee flows to neighboring states and even northward.
Moreover, given Venezuela’s geopolitical entanglements, with external backers such as Russia or Cuba supporting the regime, a larger uprising could harm the U.S. homeland. Such a scenario would involve the U.S. engaging in a costly guerrilla war too close to home, a strategically unattractive proposition.
So, from an aggressive realist perspective, restraint is not a weakness: it is a calculated decision to minimize risk, conserve resources, and avoid creating a permanent, unstable theater of operations too close to America’s borders.
2. Mediation: leveraging local actors and economic tools to impose costs without committing US troops
When the costs of direct war are too high, major powers often resort to indirect means:
- proxy confrontation,
- economic pressure, and
- diplomatic coercion.
The US approach to Venezuela closely aligns with this model.
Recognition and Support of the Opposition
On January 23-24, 2019, the United States officially recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president, in line with the constitutional demand of the Venezuelan National Assembly.
Instead of deploying troops, Washington offered diplomatic legitimacy, financial resources, and political support to opposition institutions, presenting its involvement as support for a legitimate democratic government. This strategy allowed the US to both exert influence and maintain a reasonable degree of denial about the intent of regime change.
Economic Sanctions as Strategic Leverage
Since January 2019, the US has intensified economic pressure: the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the country’s state-owned oil company, as a Specially Designated National Entity, blocking its assets in US jurisdiction. [US Treasury Department+1]
These sanctions are designed to cut off Maduro’s access to oil revenues, his main source of foreign exchange, and to deprive him of resources for protection and repression.
In addition, the US has repeatedly imposed sanctions on entities that facilitate the transport of oil to Cuba, targeting ships and companies involved in shipping Venezuelan oil abroad in support of the regime. [US Treasury Department]
This economic coercion is a form of non-mobility warfare: rather than risking American lives, Washington uses economic tools to exhaust the regime’s capabilities.
Conditional Sanctions Relief and Tactical Flexibility
The sanctions regime is not entirely rigid. In October 2023, OFAC issued General Licenses 43 and 44, which temporarily authorized limited transactions in Venezuela’s oil and gas sectors, as well as certain transactions with the gold sector and secondary bond markets. [Debevoise]
These measures were linked to a political “electoral roadmap” agreement between the Maduro government and opposition factions. [Covington & Burling+1]
OFAC retains the authority to revoke these licenses if political conditions deteriorate. [OFAC]
This flexibility reinforces a key point: U.S. economic measures are not purely punitive, but are designed to exert leverage, while also signaling a willingness to accommodate if strategic objectives can be advanced through nonmilitary means.
The Opposition’s Economic Vision and Strategic Convergence
María Corina Machado, an opposition leader, has repeatedly promoted an “ambitious program” to open Venezuela’s oil, mining, and infrastructure sectors to foreign investment. [geopoliticialeconomy.report]
She has described a “$1.7 trillion opportunity” to privatize and liberalize large parts of Venezuela’s economy, including oil production, mining, and renewable energy.
While couched in nationalist and democratic terms at home, from an aggressively realist perspective, this agenda aligns with US strategic interests: privatization and economic liberalization could reorient Venezuela towards an economic structure aligned with the US, without the need for military forces on the ground.
Restraint as Power
The United States’ decision not to launch a conventional invasion of Venezuela is not a concession. It is a deliberate act of power. Avoiding direct military intervention mitigates risk, conserves resources, and prevents the creation of an unstable conflict zone on the U.S. doorstep. At the same time, using economic coercion, diplomatic recognition, and support for domestic political actors allows Washington to influence outcomes at a much lower cost.
Seen through the lens of aggressive realism, this strategy is not passive: it is a dynamic and calculating form of political art. The United States remains deeply involved in the Venezuelan struggle, not through a military invasion of Caracas, but through leverage, coercion, strategic patience, and the invisible hand of the CIA.
In the 21st century, hegemonic power is often exercised not through conventional conquest but through economic pressure, the use of proxy economic and military actors, and the ability to produce strategic outcomes without direct military confrontation.
References
- OFAC designates PDVSA (January 28, 2019). U.S. Department of the Treasury. U.S. Department of the Treasury
- U.S. sanctions oil-sector entities shipping to Cuba. U.S. Department of the Treasury. U.S. Department of the Treasury
- CRS report on U.S. sanctions policy vs. Venezuela. Library of Congress. Congress.gov
- OFAC issues temporary general licenses after 2023 electoral roadmap. Debevoise & Plimpton / Covington & Burling. Debevoise+1
- OFAC clarifications & revocation powers. U.S. Treasury FAQs. OFAC
- María Corina Machado’s privatization plan. Geopolitical Economy Report. geopoliticaleconomy.report
