One of the main demands of the Russian side in the Ukrainian war is that, in order to agree on peace, the Ukrainians withdraw from the 4 regions, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson, thus giving Moscow the part of them that they still occupy. This is mainly in the last 3, since Luhansk has been effectively completely occupied.
The issue, beyond being political, is also critically operational, as Russia’s clear advance from 2023 to the present has been incredibly slow and bloody (for both sides) and shows both the static nature of this particular war and the proven inability of each side to achieve any major division on the front.
- Thus, as recorded by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russia began its attempt to capture Kupyansk in the Kharkiv region in October 2023 and 22 months later has not succeeded.
- Similarly, the attempt to capture Toretsk in Donetsk took 14 months of fighting from June 2024, during which Russia managed to advance 10 kilometers from the outskirts of the city to its center.
- For Pokrovsk in Donetsk, the battle for its capture has begun since February 2024 and 18 months later, it has not yet been completed. Let us note here that in the Greek public sphere, there are hundreds of publications, at least since mid-2024, that “Pokrovsk and Toretsk fell”, without, of course, contact with the reality of the fronts.
- For the capture of Chasiv Yar, in Donetsk, this began as an operation in May 2023, after the fall of Bakhmut (where the Russian mercenary group Wagner, according to Prigozhin, had “20,000 casualties”), and it took 26 months to advance 11 kilometers: for Russian troops to reach from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.
Furthermore, the disruption achieved a few days ago by the Russian attack in the direction of Dobropilia, north of Pokrovsk, has now been stopped as the Ukrainians managed to bring in reinforcements from other parts of the front (at risk, of course) and retake part of the territories that the Russians had developed.
Thus, the war of attrition of the two sides, where Russia maintains the advantage due to more available resources, is indeed developing negatively for Ukraine, but it is also so slow that for Russia to conquer the territory that it claims more, it will take years at the current pace of operations. Of course, here both sides, and especially Moscow, expect and seek that at some point the other side will make the “abrupt collapse”. That is, reaching a point where either a sector of the front will be left empty, so there will be a rapid advance, or one side of the conflict will realize the near impasse and accept capitulation.
The two sides of the war
Unknown factor and critical? What is the real situation of the two belligerents on the front. We know that Ukraine is facing serious personnel problems, despite having carried out general mobilization, and since the beginning of 2025 it has also had difficulties in the flow of military aid from the West. On the other hand, it has developed drone warfare into a central combat tool, producing millions per year (of small size), which are used to create, with the use of a small number of personnel and now special units of operators with great experience, large “death zones”, i.e. the exclusion of Russian mobility. Thus, it partially replaces the manning deficit, covering areas where every enemy movement is pounded by dozens of drones, and also giving the relevant time to mobilize any small reserve, if a major attack is observed.
Of course, the Russian side has taken similar action, incorporating the philosophy of a “drone-centric” war and bringing its own massive uses and innovations to the front.
Russia is also facing manning problems that are indirectly visible: From the continuous increase in the salaries and bonuses given to professional soldiers to join the contract (with a tripling and even a fivefold increase in some cases by 2024), to the increase in the average age of professionals (this concerns both opponents, who are fielding troops mainly in their forties and older, at the front), to the use of North Korean troops, to the increase in the recruitment of mercenaries from many countries around the world (from Nepal to Cuba and Nigeria). Of course, Moscow has the ability to carry out massive compulsory conscription if necessary. But this will have a big impact on society, especially in large urban centers, where the population does not participate significantly in the professional classification. As more people come there from the provinces and especially the many autonomous republics of the Federation in Siberia, where income is low.
Both sides in recent months have also shown a decrease in the use of motorized forces, in many parts of the front, with indications that they are either unable to make up for the losses, or that even if they do appear in some numbers, tanks and armored vehicles are quickly neutralized, as they are targeted as a priority by the enemy’s drones and artillery. With actions now being carried out using motorcycles, private cars, and even electric scooters…
There are also many reports from both sides about fatigue of the troops in the 1st line. The Ukrainians, due to a lack of reserves, cannot maintain a rotation of units at the front, in order to maintain their fighting spirit and allow for the necessary rest. Therefore, they are now also experiencing desertion phenomena. The Russians, on the other hand, are facing heavy losses in their main offensive operations, while the regime of administrative corruption, lack of materials and brutal behavior of officers towards ordinary soldiers is maintained, which are chronic problems of the Russian Armed Forces.
Also interesting is the rumor after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska, that the Russian side counter-proposed that the Ukrainians cede to it the zones they hold only in Donetsk and Luhansk, essentially in Donetsk, and that the battle on the rest of the front be “frozen” on the current line of confrontation. Thus – if this proposal is valid – Moscow limits its demand, mainly to winning the whole of Donbas (i.e. Luhansk-Donetsk), which for it has great historical and political significance to record as a “war gain”.
But especially in Donetsk, Ukraine, facing the continuous, almost 24-month-long pressure from the Russians (that’s where most of the ground fighting is taking place), has been creating a new network of fortifications and defense lines for months. Behind the current front, as the next battle zone that could last for many months until a break occurs – if it does. Something that Russia probably wants to avoid, namely getting involved once again in a battle of organized trenches using drones in open fields in front of them.
